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The Issue
In our everyday life we are surrounded by value-judgements.
Television advertisements inform us that the latest brand of
commodity is better than all the others. Sports commentators
enthusiastically claim that some football player is the greatest to
emerge in the last so many years. Book reviewers, theatre reviewers,
and concert reviewers continue to assume that it is their duty to
appraise the products of contemporary art, and to give some sort of
reasons for their appraisal, reasons connected with the nature of the
works they are reviewing. But in the academic study of literature
value-judgements have become suspect. They are commonly thought
to be tainted with elitism or caprice. One frequently encounters the
long-standing prejudice that value-judgements are a maner of personal
taste, and that no-one should interfere with the tastes of others. In
1957 Northrop Frye excluded value-judgements from his system of
literary criticism on the ground that they are subjective, and therefore
not directly communicable. And in a more recent, popular text-book
Catherine Belsey dismisses value-judgements as theoretically
misconceived, and proposes instead that criticism should concern
itself with the range of possible 'readings' of any literary text,
readings which depend on a plurality of meanings which are not fixed
or given.) My concern in this paper is to reaffirm the need for value-
judgements, to explain how they are possible, why they are
necessary, and what the implications of value-judgements are for the
politics of literary study. In this examination I shall also have to
consider to what extent literature, and the study of literature may be
described as humanistic. The standpoint of this paper is that of
Marxism.
Values and Needs
The rejection of value-judgements is generally carried out from the
standpoint of positivism. Positivism assumes a complete separation
between facts and values. Facts are objective, while values are
• Paper given to the Inaugural Colloquium of the Sydney society of Literature
and Aesthetics, Oct. 4-5, 1990.
Northrop Frye. Anatomy of Criticism, Princeton, 1957. pp.18-29; Catherine
Belsey, Critical Practice, London and New York, 1980, pp.126-128, 20.
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subjective. Facts are matters ofjudgement and truth, while values are
only matters of feeling. Factual judgements are cognitive, whereas
value-judgements are not. Value-judgements are not really judgements
at all, but disguised expressions of feeling. Since individuals may
have different feelings, value-judgements must be merely personal,
and hence private. From this point-of-view there can be no rational
discussion of value-judgements.
This account of value-judgements is too abstract. It abstracts from
the actual situations in which valuations are made, and shared. And it
makes no analysis of what valuation is. or what the relation is
between the subject who values, and the object that is valued.
An adequate account of values must relate values to needs. Value
is a relation between human needs and the objects which satisfy them.
By 'needs' I do not mean only subjective desires, or, as they may be
called, 'wants'. Needs are objective, and potentially subjective as
well. That is to say, people may have needs without being aware of
them. In a Marxist perspective 'need' is a broader category than
'interest', since Marxism uses 'interest' to mean only material needs.
The analysis of values involves two axes:-
Objects 00000
Valuation
00000
Judgemem of comparative merit
Criterion
Subject with need
The human subject has a need for an object of a certain sort with
certain properties. The object must satisfy a criterion, or standard, if it
is to satisfy the need. The criterion and the need are two facets of the
same thing. If we look at the matter from the standpoint of the object
and its quality, then the relationship is between the object and the
criterion. If we look at the matter from the standpoint of the human
subject who values, then the relationship is between the object and the
subject's need. But it is the nature of the need which determines the
criterion. Different objects have comparative merit, insofar as they
differentially satisfy the criterion, and hence the need. We may,
therefore, analyse the value-judgement into two aspects: there is the
judgement of comparative merit which moves along the horizontal
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axis in relation to the criterion; and there is the valuing which moves
along the vertical axis in relation to the need,
It is essential to distinguish between objective needs and
subjective wants, because otherwise it is impossible to make value-
judgements/or other people. If we refer valuation only to subjective
want, then each individual can only make value-judgements for
himself or herself (or uncritically endorse the value-judgements others
make for themselves, of course). I shall argue below that objective
needs are founded not only in the psycho-physical constitution of
individuals, but also in the social and material conditions of their
existence.
We must add two funher ideas to our conceptual apparatus:
firstly, that some needs have rclations to other needs as conditions.
That is to say, that one need may promote, or interfere with some
other need. Secondly, needs may have relations with other needs as
means to ends,
Before we leave this abstract analysis of value, we must get rid of
a red herring: this is the issue whether value-judgements are matters
of feeling or reflection. This is a red-herring, because in respect of
value-judgements, feeling and reflection are convertible. A valuation
may begin as a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, but one can
'rationalise' this feeling: i.e., bring to consciousness, to the level of
conscious thought, the causes of one's feeling by examining the
object. Conversely, one may scan an unfamiliar object in order to
become familiar with its properties, and as a result of this process of
reflection produce a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. (Both
these movements occur in the criticism of literary works.) Of course,
value-judgements can occur with reflection or feeling separately. I can
learn from medical evidence that smoking is bad for me, and make a
value-judgement against it as the tenninus of that movement of
thought. By contrast, I can take delight in a new flavour of ice-cream,
and the 'thought' involved in the feeling never gets beyond the level
of sensation. Where a value-judgemcnt involves reflection, even if it
is connected with feeling, we tend to talk of 'judgement'. Where a
value-judgement involves feeling connected only with sensation, or at
most perception, we tend to talk of 'taste', But even at the level of
taste there is the more or less accurate recognition that a criterion has
been satisfied.
Human Nature
An adequate theory of the real needs of human beings (as opposed to
an abstract analysis of valuation) must be founded in a theory of
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human nature. And an adequate theory of human nature must
recognise the two dimensions of what is general to the human species
('general human nature'), and what is specific to actually existing
human societies, or human nature as modified by determinate social
and material conditions of life. This issue has been confused ever
since the Romantic period by the common belief that there is no such
thing as 'general human nature'. It has been widely held that Marx
rejected the concept of a general human nature. But Norman Geras
has shown that this is not so. Marx explicitly recognised the concept,
and such a concept is presupposed by his mature work.2
An account of general human nature must begin with the fact that
human capacities are generalised in their nature. and not determined to
fixed patterns of behaviour. Human beings have physical and mental
powers that may be directed to an unlimited variety of activities. The
biological foundation of this is. as is well known. the evolutionary
acquisition by our hominid ancestors of upright posture. stereoscopic
vision, an enlarged brain, a hand with an opposable thumb. a
lengthened period of maturation. and a vocal apparatus which makes
possible language. and thereby thought. The acquisition of these
characteristics was determined by the evolutionary value of social
labour: i.e., the deliberate production of the means of subsistence
with the use of tools, as a social, and not merely individual activity.3
With this biological constitution human beings are able to
manipulate objects. think about the world, and communicate with
each other. Because human capacities are general in scope, they may
be redirected away from the immediate ends of material life to higher
ends: the creation of art. the worship of God, the contemplation of the
universe, or perhaps just the improvement of ways to pursue the ends
of material life. The general scope of human capacities is, therefore,
the essence of human freedom. But, paradoxically, this essential
feature of human life also brings into existence the possibility of
domination: human beings can tum themselves into objects to serve
their own ends, and they can also tum other human beings into
objects to serve their ends.
Human beings not only have capacities, they have liabilities: i.e.,
liabilities to feel, and to suffer. They are liable to feel joy and sorrow.
2 Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend, London.
1983.
3 See George Novack, Humanism and Socialism, New York, 1973, pp.19-24.
The classical Marxist discussion is Engels' 'The Part Played by Labour in the
Transition from Ape to Man'. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected
Works, Moscow. 1970, vol. 3. pp.66-77.
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love and hate, hope and fear, desire and aversion, pleasure and pain,
etc. In the fluctuations of these feelings there are certain constant
panems, or measures: A loves B; A loses B; A feels grief.
Human beings are, therefore, essentially contradictory creatures:
they are blessed with the capacity to act in an infinite variety of ways,
to think an infinite variety of thoughts, to believe an infinite variety of
beliefs, and at the same time are condemned to suffer in quite
determinate ways. They are the reality of Hegel's identical subject-
object, but this identity is a contradictory unity.
Insofar as human beings are essentially social and material
beings, we must posit certain basic needs. Material needs will include
food, shelter, clothing (where necessary) and health. Psycho-physical
needs will include sleep, play, exercise, and sexual satisfaction.
Psychological and social needs depend on the fact that human beings
are social individuals, both social beings and individuals at the same
time. Psychological and social needs, therefore, will include:
I. the individual's need for self-realization, and the achievement
of well-being: i.e., the fullest possible development of the
individual's powers, and the achievement of well-being that is
both psychological and physical.
2. mutuality in personal relationships, which moves from
enlightened self-interest to love.
3. the recognition of the necessities and possibilities in
reproducing, or transforming the social order.
The psychological and social needs will subsume (in principle) the
material, and psycho-physical needs.
We can posit, also, basic moral and political needs. Human life,
both individually and collectively, requires courage, and self-control,
loyalty and benevolence, truth and rationality, and some sort of
justice.4
I am not arguing that all these needs are compatible with each
other in any given circumstances, either for an individual, or for all
individuals, or for society collectively. Generally, human history has
proceeded so far on the basis that they are not. I am not even arguing
that all these needs are recognised. They commonly are not. I am
merely arguing that they are objectively real needs, which exist
whether anyone recognises them or not, and that to the extent that
4 This is not thc place to argue a thcory of Justice, Marxist or otherwise. But it
is clear that no human society can be stable over the long-tenn without at
least an ideal of Justice. For a Marxist discussion, see Nonnan Geras, 'The
Controvcrsy about Marx and Justice' in Marxist Theory, ed. Alex Callinicos,
Oxford, 1989, pp.211-267.
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they are not satisfied. human life is diminished.
Of course. human beings can deny not only the needs of others.
but their own needs. An individual can choose to lead a celibate life.
What the effect of this will be on her physical and mental well-being
will depend on the nature of the rest of her life. One individual can
murder another. and the same individual can also commit suicide.
There is nothing problematical here for this account of needs. because
needs are objective. and not just subjective desires. Being objective.
if a need is denied, there will be consequences. even if those
consequences are only dimly apprehended. and the cause of the
consequences altogether ignored.
In insisting on the objective character of human needs. I am
pursuing one of the themes of Marx's 'Theses on Feuerbach·. viz.
that the subjectivity of human beings is objectively conditioned.s This
is the only way out of subjectivism and relativism in values.
So much for general human nature. which has to be considered in
terms of capacities. liabilities. and needs.
Specific human natures come into being through the determinate
social and material conditions of life of any actual. historical society
with its relations to other societies with which it comes in contact.
Here I follow Marx. The social relationships into which people enter
in order to produce. and reproduce their material life depend on the
state of development of their productive forces. These social
production relations in turn necessitate other social and/or political
institutions to organise the reproduction of the life of the society. And
the social consciousness of the society, including not only the
mentality of the people. but its customs and moral codes. and its
formal systems of thought and belief are conditioned by the totality of
the social and material conditions of its life. The whole system is kept
in being in pre-class societies by the agency of the people as a whole
working relatively in co-operation; while in class societies the agency
is that of the ruling class acting in its own interests, and exploiting the
various forms of compulsion to which the ruled classes are
subjected.6 The net result of this specification for general human
5 Marx, 'Theses on Feucrbach', in Marx and Engels. Selected Works, vol. 1.
pp.13-15.
6 The above account is a conflation based on different passages from Marx.
See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The German Ideology: Part One, ed.
C.J. Arthur. London, 2nd ed., 1974, pp.42-48; Marx, 'Preface to A
Contribution 10 the Critique of Political Economy' in Marx and Engels,
Selected Works. vol. I, pp.503-504; Marx. Capital. vol. 3. Harrnondsworth:
Penguin Books, in association with New Left Review, 1981, pp.927-928.
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nature will be that some needs will be recognised. and others ignored.
or suppressed. Some capacities will be promoted. while others will
be discouraged. In some circumstances human feeling will be
considered. and in other circumstances not. There will be conflicts
and contradictions within individuals. between individuals. and
between social groups. The panems in which general human nature is
specified will be registered in the customs. laws. moral codes,
philosophical and religious beliefs. and scientific theories. etc. of the
society.
Human nature must forever move within this domain of needs.
capacities and liabilities specified by the actual social and material
conditions of life. The only general aim that the human species can set
itself is the removal of contradictions in the satisfaction of its needs by
the development of its individual and collective powers.
Literature and Human Nature
Literature (and within 'literature' I include. for the sake of
convenience. the oral compositions of pre-literate society) is. then.
concerned with specific human natures. the specific patterns of needs.
capacities. and liabilities of people in definite. historical societies. It is
concerned with the actual and the possible. the real and the ideal. the
necessary and the free. insofar as these are manifested in activities.
feelings. relationships. values. and beliefs. Literature concerns itself
with 'the good life' and its conditions. from the collective work-songs
of pre-literate societies to War and Peace. To this extent. it may be
said that literature is humanistic. But this is wholly abstract. It has
nothing to do with Renaissance humanism. Christian humanism.
liberal humanism. Marxist humanism. or any other historical
humanism, for these are all specific ideologies serving specific needs.
Literature cannot depict the 'good life' purely objectively. Not
only is the subject-matter of literature some specific human nature. but
it is always produced from the standpoint of some specific human
nature. This standpoint is always social. even when not apparently
so. Novels of alienation presuppose the social life from which the
characters are alienated. Romantic lyrics mediate between alienated
human subjects and a Nature invested with human powers and
qualities. In this way. also. literature may be described as humanistic.
if 'humanistic' means to do with the interdependence of human
beings. But again. this is wholly abstract.
Through literary works. then. human beings produce. and
discover their own specific human natures (Le.• the specific human
natures of their society, not their individual personalities). Insofar as
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they read the literatures of other societies (or of their own society in
the past), their awareness of the general possibilities of human life is
extended. These practices are also usually described as humanistic,
but, as before, the description is quite abstract.
It follows from the above account that literary works are, or ought
to be, valued in general for serving the above purpose: viz. the
production and discovery of specific human natures, for this satisfies
the need of human beings to develop social self-knowledge. This in
turn is part of the general project to increase the satisfaction of human
needs by the development of individual and collective powers.
Judgements of comparative merit amongst literary works will be
concerned with the degree of their truthfulness to the specific human
nature they take as their material.
However, this general account of literary valuation does not deny
the fact that in particular historical societies the production of literature
will serve specific social needs peculiar to those societies. This
distinction between the general and the particular is essential to
understanding the relationship between value-judgements, and the
historical character of literary works.
Literature as Expression and/or Imitation
The account which I have given of literature implies that literary
works express or imitate human reality. But these concepts of
expression and imitation have been called in question by what
Catherine Belsey calls 'post-Saussurian' thought. She dismisses 'the
theory that literature reflects the reality of experience as it is perceived
by one (especially gifted) individual, who expresses it in a discourse
which enables other individuals to recognise it as true.' This theory
she calls 'expressive realism '.7
Expression
To take the concept of expression first. Belsey does not just restate
the doctrine of the 'biographical fallacy': viz. that it is erroneous to
interpret literary works in accordance with what is known of their
author's life. Nor does she just restate the doctrine of the 'intentional
fallacy': viz. that it is wrong to think that literary works are not, in
some sense, independent of their author's intentions.s
7 Belsey, p.7.
8 For both fallacies, see W. K. Wimsall and Monroe C. Beardsley. 'The
Intentional Fallacy' in W. K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the
Meaning of Poetry, London, 1970, pp.3-18.
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Her rejection of the concept of expression of experience by an
individual involves a denial of the autonomy of human subjectivity; it
depends on the claim that 'the subject is constructed in language and
in discourse and, since the symbolic order in its discursive use is
closely related to ideology, in ideology. '9 In other words, the
subjectivity of individual human beings does not exist prior to, or
independent of, language; and since language, as discourse, inscribes
the ideology of human society, human subjectivity does not exist
prior to, or independent of, ideology.
This is an ambiguous half-truth. Does the statement mean that the
human subject is constructed by language, discourse, and ideology?
Or, does it mean that human subjects construct themselves socially by
means of language, discourse, and ideology (leaving open the
possibility that other means may be used as well)? The former of
these statements is false, whereas the latter is true.
The objection to the former interpretation is that it reifies these
abstractions, language, discourse, and ideology. In this view human
beings become the passive objects of these transcendental powers,
while having no powers of their own. But how could language, or
anything else, turn human beings as essentially passive objects into
active subjects?
There is a confusion here between the idea of language as a
condition, and the idea of it as an efficient cause. Language is
certainly a condition of thought, such that language can be the
instrument of human subjects. But, a condition is not necessarily an
efficient cause, and so need not be considered as a hidden pseudo-
agent.
Ideology should not be considered in abstraction, but in its
definite social connections. An ideology may be defined as the ideas,
beliefs, and value-systems which reflect the needs and interests of a
social group. But the aspect that an ideology presents to human
beings depends on whether it is the ideology of one's own group, or
that of another group with which one's own group is in opposition.
The ideology of one's own group is the articulation of shared
activities and experiences, shared identities, values, aims, purposes,
and any beliefs about the world that bear on the life of the group. This
is not to say that the ideology will not on occasion appear as an
adverse power. It will impose duties on the members of the group.
By contrast, the ideology of an opposing group will present itself not
merely as an adverse power, but as a hostile power. This group may
9 BeIsey. p.6 I.
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try to impose its ideology on its enemies. But empirical evidence
suggests that social groups tend to resist their opponents' ideology.1O
The only issue of theoretical interest in this connection concerns
ideologies that are universal in form, such as Christianity. Such
universal ideologies articulate in thought, in an ideal way, the
relations between different social groups in a social order, and thus
become a site for the contestation of different needs and interests.
Thus, in the class conflicts in England in the fourteenth and
seventeenth centuries different variants of Christianity appeared to
express the needs, and justify the actions of the opposing sides.
Ideology, therefore, remains the creation of active human
subjects. And the relationship between subjectivity, and ideology
cannot be considered a sufficient ground for dismissing the idea of the
expression of experience by an individual human subject. The claim
that it is is another red herring.
Belsey denies that the individual human subject can be the origin
of meaning. I I But this is mere confusion. If I use the English
language to state that I am weary of the academic year, and am
longing for Christmas, it is certainly true that the meaning of my
statement depends on the social institutions of the academic year and
Christmas, and on the social existence of the English language, from
which I select items to make my statement. But the statement is,
nonetheless, mine, and expresses my feelings. Speech-acts have both
individual and social aspects. Whoever doubted it? At this level, the
issue is utterly trivial.
But, at the level of literary works, the issue is important. It is true
that literary works are produced from a social standpoint, but they
are, nonetheless, produced by individuals with a particular personal
history and experience, and therefore with particular powers and
interests. To regard a literary work as only the articulation of a social
standpoint is to ignore what is most distinctive in the work. There can
be no justification in dismissing the individuality of a literary work for
the sake of its social character, any more than there can be a
justification for the reverse.
Imitation
We must now consider the other side of the theory of 'expressive
realism', the idea that literary works reflect, or imitate human reality.
lOSee, for example. Alex Callinicos. Making History: Agency. Structure and
Change in Social Theory, Cambridge. 1987, pp.140-147.
11 Belsey, p.3.
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Betsey is concerned to deny this idea as well. She states:
The claim that a literary form reflects the world is simply
tautological. If by 'the world' we understand the world we
ellperience, the world differentiated by language, then the claim
that realism reflects the world means that realism reflects the
world constructed in language. This is a tautology. If discourses
articulate concepts through a system of signs which signify by
means of their relationship to each other rather than to entities
in the world, and if literature is a signifying practice, all it can
reflect is the order inscribed in particular discourses, not the
nature of the world. Thus, what is intelligible as realism is the
conventional and therefore familiar, 'recognizable' articulation
and distribution of concepts. It is intelligible as 'realistic'
precisely because it reproduces what we already seem to know.t2
This claim depends on two assumptions: firstly. that the world we
experience is constructed in language; and secondly. that signs signify
by means of their relationship to each other rather than to entities in
the world.
The first assumption may be glossed by two other statements of
Belsey:
[Saussurel argued that far from providing a set of labels for
entities which exist independently in the world, language
precedes the existence of independent entities, making the world
intelligible by differentiating between concepts.t 3
The world. which without signification would be experienced as a
continuum, is divided up by language into entities which then
readily come to be experienced as essentially distinct. 14
Belsey attributes to Saussure a kind of linguistic Kantianism. in
which language is the structuring principle of the phenomenal world.
It not only singles out the entities in the world. and provides
conceptual equivalents of them. It actually brings into existence the
material bodies of the world we experience.
Saussure, of course, does not say anything of the sort. What he
claims is that language is the condition for distinct thought. Without
language there would be no concepts. He states:
Psychologically our thought-apart from its expression in
words-is only a shapeless and indistinct mass. Philosophers
and linguists have always agreed in recognizing that without the
help of signs we would be unable to make a clear-cut, consistent
distinction between two ideas. Without language, thought is a
vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and
12 Belsey. ppA6-47.
13 Belsey. p.38. My italics.
14 Belsey. pAO. My italics.
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nothing is distinct before the appearance of language. IS
Belsey's misinterpretation of Saussure is perhaps influenced by a
common misunderstanding of the theory of Edward Sapir. Sapir
writes:
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone. nor alone
in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood. but are
very much at the mercy of the particular language which has
become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an
illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without
the use of language and that language is merely an incidental
means of solving specific problems of communication or
reflection. The fact of the maller is that the 'real world' is to a
large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the
group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be
considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in
which different societies live are distinct worlds. not merely
the same world with different labels attached ... We see and hear
and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the
language habits of our community predispose certain choices of
interpretation. I6
Terence Hawkes, who quotes this passage, glosses it by saying:
There is therefore. concluded Sapir in a classic statement, no such
thing as an objective. unchanging 'real world· .... The
assumption fundamental to this conception is that the world of
space and time is in fact a continuum, without firm and
irrevocable boundaries or divisions, which each language divides
up and encodes in accordance with its own particular structure. l ?
Contrary to Hawkes, Sapir begins. in the quoted passage, by
assuming that there is an objective world, and that it may be
disinguished from the 'real world' in quotation marks of social
consciousness inscribed in language. Whatever the validity of Sapir's
view of language's capacity to victimise human beings, he did not
assume that the material world is constituted by language. Hawkes'
misunderstanding of Sapir is analogous to Belsey's misunderstanding
of Saussure.
If all this only means that a human community will view the
world from the standpoint of their own needs and interests, then this
15 Ferdinand de Saussure. Course in General Linguistics, cd. Charles Bally
and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Reidlinger; translated
from the French by Wade Baskin; introduced by Jonathan Culler, London.
rev. ed. 1974, pp.III-112.
16 Edward Sapir, Selected Writings in Language. Culture. and Personality, ed.
David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley. 1949, p.162.
17 Terence Hawkes. Structuralism and Semiotics. London. 1977, pp.31-32.
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is true. But this is quite compatible with there being a real. objective
world, and therefore with the possibility that discourse, of whatever
kind, may reflect it more or less accurately, or fail to do so.
Belsey's second assumption that signs signify by means of their
relationship to each other rather than to entities in the world does
correspond to Saussure's thinking. But on this issue it is Saussure
who is misleading.
In his doctrine of the sign Saussure dispenses with any concept of
reference: i.e. a relation between the sign and an object in the real
world. The signification of signs is a relationship between the two
aspects of the sign, the sound-image (or signifier), and the concept
(or signified). The sound-image signifies the concept. As elements in
language, the sound-images have no distinct character in themselves;
their distinct character depends on their relations with each other, and
on their relations with their concepts. Similarly. the concepts also
have no distinct character in themselves, but depend for their distinct
character on their relations with each other, and their relations with
their sound-images. When a sound-image and a concept come
together, there is constituted a sign. But the relation between the
sound-image, and the concept is arbitrary or, to be more exact, is
conventional. 18
This is a very useful doctrine, as it allows Saussure to investigate
the relations between the sound-images of language (signifiers), and
the changes that occur in the relation between the sound-images and
the concepts (signifieds) in the history of the language. For example,
the idea that sound-images, insofar as they are elements of language,
have no distinct character in themselves i11uminates the fact that a
whole group of different sounds may all be recognised as the same
word by speakers of the language. The differences amongst the
positive characters of the sounds are suppressed. 19 The idea of the
arbitrary nature of the sign explains the contradiction of both the
inertia, and the facility of linguistic change.20
Nonetheless, with respect to the idea of reference Saussure's
doctrine of the sign is incoherent. In a traditional theory of reference a
sign is a sign in vinue of a relation to an object in the real world. A
sign must be a sign of something, otherwise it cannot be a sign. A
sign is essentially relational. But Saussure denies this relationship of
sign and object. Instead, he substitutes 'signification', which is the
18 Saussure, pp.65-70. 111-14.
19 Saussure. pp.118-119.
20 Saussure. pp.143-179.
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relationship between the two pans of the sign, the sound-image and
its concept.21 And Saussure claims that concepts do not pre-exist
language.22 A concept only comes into existence in language. But a
concept is also a relational term: a concept must be a concept of
something, otherwise it is not a concept. Since concepts do not pre-
exist language, they cannot have their conceptuality in themselves.
Either they must get it from their sound-image, which is impossible
(since the sound-image only acquires its meaningfulness from its
relation to the concept); or, they must get it from a reference to an
object in the real world, which Saussure denies. Saussure's doctrine
of the sign is, therefore, incoherent.
What happens in language is that a hitherto meaningless sound is
associated by human beings with an object in the real world. This
association is then displaced into the sound-image, and suppressed,
so that when the human beings hear the sound-image, they no longer
perceive it as a sound image, but think it as a concept. Concepts are
the result of this process of association, displacement, and
suppression. It is impossible to theorise language without the notions
of human intentionality, and reference.
Saussure's procedure is valid as a methodological abstraction in
order to isolate an area of study: viz. the arbitrary relation between
signifiers and signifieds. But as a claim in semantics, it is false.
The result of this excursion into linguistics is that Belsey's claim
that literary forms cannot reflect the world will not hold up. It is based
on two assumptions: the first-that the world we experience is
constructed in language-is misconceived; the second-that signs
signify by means of their relationship to each other rather than to
entities in the world-is incoherent.
It should be added that Saussure's linguistics concern langue, or a
language-system, rather than parole, or individual utterances.23 Now
literary works are individual utterances, not language-systems. It is
misguided, therefore, to transfer to literary works the attributes of
language-systems. There is nothing in Saussure's linguistics to
suggest that he thought that individual utterances were incapable of
truth and falsehood. There is no ground, therefore, in Saussure's
work to call in question the capacity of literary works to reflect reality.
Admittedly, the way in which a work of fiction reflects reality is quite
different from the way a statement asserts a fact. But this difference
21 Saussure, pp.65-67, 114.
22 Saussure, pp.ll1.112.
23 Saussure, pp.7-11.
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belongs to a completely different problematic.24
Post-Saussureans seem to think that the whole of language-use
falls under the headings of semantics and grammar. They silently
abolish those features of language-use that belong to logic and
rhetoric. There is no justification in Saussure's work for this wanton
destruction.
Althusser
For her account of ideology Belsey depends on Louis Althusser, the
French structuralist Marxist. Belsey agrees with Althusser against the
Marx of The German Ideology that ideology is not just false
consciousness; and appropriating Althusser's definition of ideology,
she says:
...what is represented in ideology is 'not the system of the real
relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the
imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in
which they live' (Althusser, 1971, p.155)2S
Whatever one may think of Althusser's definition of ideology, it
is bizarre that Belsey should adopt it, since Althusser, as a
philosophical materialist, assumes the existence of a real world
independent of human thought. How this is compatible with Belsey's
philosophical idealism, which constitutes the objective world through
language remains mysterious.
Althusser counterposes ideology to science. Ideology is the
sphere of sensing, perceiving, feeling, and imagination, while science
is the production of knowledge.26 Sensing, perceiving, feeling, and
imagination do not count as knowledge. In its strict unqualified
form, this theory is self-subverting. For, science can only produce
knowledge on the basis of data partly supplied by ideology (and
partly supplied by previous scientific production).27 But the data of
ideology are tainted with non-scientificity, as they do not count as
knowledge. Since a science can only be as good as its data, the
resulting scientific 'knowledge' produced must also be tainted. The
24 See, for example, John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts, Chapel
Hill, 1946, pp.141-207.
25 Belsey, p.57, citing Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other
Essays, London, 1971. For Marx's view, see Marx and Engels, The German
Ideology: Part One, pp.37, 47, 50-52.
26 Louis Althusser, 'A Letter on Art in Reply to Andr~ Daspre' in Essays on
Ideology, London, 1984, p.175.
27 Louis Althusser, For Marx, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1969,
pp.183-184.
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distinction, therefore, between science as knowledge, and other fOnTIS
of awareness is artificial, and impossible to sustain.
Althusser's theory of science and ideology is connected with his
theory of an, a theory which, in its developed fonn produced by
Pierre Macherey, is also appropriated by Bclsey.28
Althusser writes:
I do not rank real art among the ideologies, although art does
have a quite particular and specific relationship with ideology ...
Art (I mean authentic art, not works of an average or mediocre
level) does not give us a knowledge in the strict sense, it
therefore does not replace knowledge (in the modem sense:
scientific knowledge), but what it gives us does nevertheless
maintain a certain specific relationship with knowledge. This
relationship is not one of identity but one of difference. Let me
explain. I believe that the peculiarity of art is to 'make us see'
(nous donner Ii voir), 'make us perceive', 'make us feel'
something which alludes to reality...
What art makes us see. and therefore gives to us in the form of
'seeing', 'perceiving' and 'feeling' (which is not the form of
knowing) is the ideology from which it is born, in which it
bathes, from which it detaches itself as art, and to which it
alludes .... Balzac and Solzhenitsyn give us a 'view' of the
ideology to which their work alludes and with which it is
constantly fed, a view which presupposes a retreal. an internal
distantiation from the very ideology from which their novels
emerged. They make us 'perceive' (but not know) in some sense
from the inside, by an internal distance, the very ideology in
which they are hc1d.29
What is remarkable in Althusser's theory of an from the
standpoint of Belsey's appropriation of it is that Althusser's view
presupposes the very conception of an as 'felt life' or 'lived
experience' , that belongs to the hcnneneutic tradition, which Belsey
wishes to reject. To put it bluntly, Althusser presupposes the methods
of reading of LA. Richards, and ER. Leavis.30 What Althusser is
offering is a theoretical reinterpretation, from a Marxist point-of-view,
of the henneneutic conception of 'lived experience'. This becomes
obvious in what he later says:
28 Belsey, pp.106-109, 135-139, 143-144. See Pierre Macherey, A Theory of
Literary Production, translated from the French by Geoffrey Wall, London,
1978.
29 Althusser, 'A Letter on Art' in Essays on Ideology, pp.173-175.
30 Sec I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment,
London, 1929, pp.179-234; F. R. Leavis, 'Literary Criticism and
Philosophy' in The Common Pursuit, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books in
association with Chatto and Windus. 1976, pp.211-222.
54
David Brooks
Neither Balzac nor Solzhenitsyn gives us any k.nowledge of the
world they describe, they only make us 'see', 'perceive', or 'feel'
the reality of the ideology of that world. When we speak of
ideology we should know that ideology slides into all human
activity, that it is identical with the 'lived' experience of human
existence itself: that is why the form in which we are 'made to see'
ideology in great novels has as its content the 'Jived' experience
of individuals. This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a
pure 'reality', but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology
in its peculiar relationship to the real. This is an important
comment, for it enables us to understand that art does not deal
with a reality peculiar to itself. with a peculiar domain of reality
in which it has a monopoly (as you tend to imply when you write
that 'with art, knowledge becomes human', that the object of art
is 'the individual'), whereas science deals with a differenl domain
of reality (say, in opposition to 'lived experience' and the
'individual', the abstraction of structures). Ideology is also an
object of science, the 'lived experience' is also an object of
science, the 'individual' is also an object of science. The real
difference between art and science lies in the specific form in
which they give us the same object in quite different ways: art in
the form of 'seeing' and 'perceiving' or 'feeling', science in the
form of knowledge (in the strict sense, by concepts») 1
Althusser is clearly polemicising against the hermeneutic theory
that the humanities and natural sciences have different objects, and
consequently must use different methods: nature presents us with
non-human, repeatable occurrences which must be investigated by
observation, deduction, induction, and so forth in order to discover
general laws under which events can be subsumed as instances.
Human life presents us with the unique lived experience of human
individuals, which can only be known 'from the inside' by empathy,
imagination, and understanding.32 Althusser is re-introducing a
quasi-Hegelian theory that art and science are concerned about the
same sorts of object, but at different levels of awareness. Art never
rises beyond sensation, perception, and feeling, whereas science
attains to the only true form of knowledge in conceptual thought.33
As we have seen, Althusser's distinction between scientific
knowledge, and ideology is artificial. and collapses. But his theory of
art is valuable in two ways: it offers to integrate the object of
3 I Althusser, 'A Letter on An' in Essays on Ideology, p.175.
32 See, for example, Roy 1. Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Inlro·
fduction to Currenl Theories of Understanding, Berkeley, 1982, pp.I-23.
33 See Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, being Part Three of The Encyclopaedia of
the Philosophical Sciences (/830), Translated by William Wallace,
Together with the Zusiitze in Boumann's Text (/845) Translated by A. V.
Miller, with Foreword by 1. N. Findlay, F.B.A., Oxford, 1971, pp.292-315.
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henneneutics-' felt life', 'lived experience'-into Marxist social
theory, and so contribute to a Marxist account of human subjectivity.
Secondly, the conception of the internal distantiation that an achieves
in relation to ideology draws attention to the ideological contradictions
that can occur in works of an, contradictions that can become
palpable, because works of an present their objects at the levels of
sensation, perception, and feeling. The internal distantiation of an is
precisely the palpability of the contradictions.
With this view of an, it is not surprising to see that Althusser
assumes that works of an have comparative merit rOAn (I mean
authentic an, not works of an average or mediocre leve),)]. This
assumption is necessary to the theory: only good works of an can
have the power to present their 'lived experience' with such
palpability that the internal distantiation is achieved.34
What Belsey does not seem to realise is that before Althusser's
critical method can be applied, Leavis' method of criticism, the
method of henneneutics, must be applied first. Leavis says:
The critic's aim is, fITSt, to realize as sensitively and completely
as possible this or that which claims his attention; and a certain
valuing is implicit in the realizing. As he matures in experience
of the new thing he asks, explicitly and implicitly: 'Where does
this come? How does it stand in relation to ...? How relatively
important does it seem?35
As Leavis says on another occasion:
[My hints) all involve the principle that literature will yield to
the sociologist, or anyone else, what it has to give only if it is
approached as literature. For what I have in mind is no mere
industrious searching for 'evidence', and collecting examples, in
whatever happens to have been printed and preserved. The
'literature' in question is something in the definition of which
terms of value·judgement figure essentially, and something
accessible only to the reader capable of intelligent and sensitive
criticism.36
It may be that Leavis' method by itself is inadequate, and needs to
be supplemented. But to try to use Althusser's method without
Leavis's foundation is attempting to build a castle in the air.
34 For an adverse judgment on Althusser's remarks, see Terry Eagleton,
Criticism and Ideology; A Study in Marxist Literary Theory, London, 1978,
pp.82-86.
35 Leavis, 'Literary Criticism and Philosophy' in The Common Pursuit, p.213.
36 F. R. Leavis, 'Literature and Society' in The Common Pursuit, p.193.
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Literary Criticism and Politics
It is true that Macherey, and other post-Althusscrians have moved
away from this position, but in this I think they are mistaken.
Macherey argues that there is no such thing as Literature, only pieces
of writing that may become 'literary' to the extent that they are used
ideologically in definite cultural practices. In this view, it is the
constitution of writing as Literature that should be studied.37
The obvious, and in my view valid objection to this is that literary
study ceases to be the study of literature, and becomes the study of
the history of cultural politics. Macherey would no doubt reply,
'Exactly so. That's all there is.' But, in this case, Marxist critics have
a problem with value. Either they can abandon value altogether. and
so revert to positivism. in which case it is possible that a telegram
might one day become constituted as Literature. Thus, what may
count as Literature becomes wholly indeterminate, and the passive
reflection of external ideological interests. Or, the critics must
privilege their own values, while turning them loose, ungrounded, to
the contingent play of capricious desire. In which case, they revert to
subjectivism. The only way out of this dilemma is to recognize the
existence of objective needs. But the assumption of objective needs
reinstitutes the objective character of literature.
Of course, it is true that in specific societies literary works may be
put to any number of social purposes peculiar to the society. Dr
Johnson blamed Shakespeare for writing without a conscious moral
purpose, and held that the metaphysical poets could not write correct
verse. 38 But. in these views Johnson was holding to false
preconceptions. His own culture, and its socio-political imperatives
encouraged him to privilege specific forms of writing, and
discouraged him from paying attention to the actual principles of
organisation of Shakespeare's plays, and the metaphysical poets'
poems. (This does not imply that all metaphysical poems are good.) It
is necessary to reaffirm what is valid in liberal humanism, and agree
with Arnold that the duty of the critic is to see the object as it really is.
'Disinterestedness' has been unfavourably viewed by Marxist critics
as some sort of bourgeois mystification, but quite unnecessarily so.
37 See Pierre Macherey, 'An Interview with Pierre Macherey', R~d Letters. 5
(1977), pp.3-9, and 'Problems of Reflection' in Literatllre, Society and the
Sociology of Literatllre, University of Essex, 1977, pp.41-54.
38 See Samuel Johnson, Selected Writings, edited with an Introduction and
Notes by Patrick Cruttwell, Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986,
pp.270 (from 'Preface to Shakespeare') and 403 (from 'The Life of
Cowley').
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In bourgeois discourse 'disinterested' is systematically ambiguous. It
can mean just 'honest', willing to examine evidence, and not distort
or falsify it according to one's desires. It can also mean that human
beings should, and can dissociate themselves from any social or
ideological standpoint they may have. It is everybody's duty to try to
be 'disinterested' in the first sense; and no one can possibly be
disinterested in the second sense, even if they imagine they are. I may
study literature from my own ideological standpoint, but I can still
pay attention to the quality of work. If I read a socialist novel, I
cannot automatically judge it to be good, merely because I am a
socialist. If it is bad, I must say so, not only out of duty, but in the
interests of socialism. To do otherwise would not only discredit me,
but also the social movement I support. This assumes that it is
possible to distinguish between particular political interests, and
judgements of comparative merit, and it is. (I do not say this is
always easy in practice.)
The other side of this issue is that there is a genuine political
dimension to criticism. This can be illustrated from an episode in
Homer's Odyssey. After Odysseus has returned home, and
massacred the suitors, he punishes the goatherd, Melanthios, and the
undutiful maidservants. Melanthios has previously insulted Odysseus
without recognising him, and the maidservants have slept with the
suitors. Odysseus hangs the maidservants in the courtyard, and then
methodically mutilates Melanthios. cutting off his nose and ears,
hands and feet, and his genitals.39 There is no suggestion that the
poem takes up a critical stance on this. On the contrary, it seems to be
the just thing for a master to do to his slaves in the circumstances. On
a Christian, or post-Christian sensibility, the effect can only be
horrifying. The punishmcnt sccms so out-of-proportion to the
offence. But one cannot say it is bad literature. For humanists,
Christian, liberal, or Marxist, the only social purpose this episode can
scrvc is to provide an occasion to affirm that whatever sort of society
we might want to create in the future, it will not be like that.
Humanists cannot assume that all literary works will serve their
moral/political purposes.
But not everyone is a humanist. Contemporary militaristic
disciples of Nietzsche might cry exultingly, 'That is exactly the sort of
society we wish to create!' At the point where humanists and
Nietzscheans divide. criticism becomes political. This is unavoidable.
Criticism must reject the positions of both the aesthete. and her
39 Homer, The Odyssey, xxii, 419-477.
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counterpan, the consumer of mass culture. An aesthete is someone
who restricts her interest in literary works to judgments of merit, and
refuses to recognise the social, moral, and political needs that literary
works exist to satisfy. This is not only irresponsible from an external
point-of-view; it is to be in state of practical contradiction with the
works themselves, since the essence of literary works is to present
variants of 'the good life' to assist in the collective project of
resolving the contradictions between human needs.
It is easy to condemn the aesthete for irresponsibility, and futility:
it is harder to know what to do about the consumer of mass culture. It
is easy to judge the merit of the commodities of mass culture. A 'Mills
and Boone' romance omits, simplifies and distorts human material in
such ways as to provide an escapist fantasy, which encourages its
middle-aged readers to regress to a mental age of early adolescence.
This is not liberating, or empowering. To defend mass culture on
grounds of personal taste, or to blame the critic for elitism is bluff and
bluster. The commodities of mass culture make vast profits for the
owners of the mass-communications networks. To leave their
products uncriticised is tacitly to suppon pan of the most powerful
and wealthy ruling class that has ever existed in the history of
civilization. What is more elitist than that?
Criticism must be social: it must involve a critical dialogue, since
it is easy to be led astray by personal preference, or ideological
conviction. To engage in dialogue is difficult now because of the
proliferation of critical languages, but the attempt must be made, if
criticism is to have any social value. It will be most fruitful if it is
recognised that value-judgements arc founded in objective needs.
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